This article reviews the use in the flotation of Standard Life plc of the prospectus passport for cross-border offers of securities within the EU that was introduced by the Prospectus Directive (2003
I. Introduction
A manifestation of a real single securities market in Europe would be a significant amount of cross-border issuance activity by issuers. 1 Shaping regulatory policy so as to promote cross-border offerings of securities has been on the EU policy agenda for many years and mutual recognition procedures for prospectuses and listing particulars, which were intended specifically to achieve that objective, were adopted between 1987 and 1989.
2 However, these procedures were rarely used. There were perceived to be flaws in their design, in particular with regard to the extent to which it remained permissible for individual Member States to require prospectuses and listing particulars to include additional information for their home market and to insist on full translation of the documents. These features undermined the appeal of the mutual recognition procedures because of the additional costly complexity involved in tailoring documentation so as to satisfy various different sets of national regulatory requirements. 3 The revised design for mutual recognition in the new Prospectus Directive, adopted in 2003, 4 is that a prospectus which is approved by the issuer's home State is valid throughout the EU, without the need for further regulatory approvals. 5 The position on the use of different languages is slightly complicated but, essentially, if a cross-border prospectus is written in a language that is customary in the sphere of international finance (such as English), host Member States can require translation only of the short summary. 6 During the passage of the Prospectus Directive into law, market participants were rather doubtful about the degree of interest that there would be in the new streamlined procedure for cross-border prospectuses. It was thought that retail equity offerings making use of the prospectus route would remain rare and that issuers would continue to rely on secondary market linkages to reach geographically dispersed retail investors. 7 Early experience of life under the Prospectus Directive suggests that the prospectus passport is being used quite extensively, but mainly for prospectuses relating to bonds and derivative securities issued by banks and other financial companies. 8 At least so far as can be seen from data published by the British and Irish securities regulatory authorities, to date there have been relatively few passported crossborder prospectuses relating to straightforward equity and, of these, there were often special circumstances, such as the offer being to existing share-Directive). holders (a rights issue or open offer) or to employees, or being in connection with a takeover, that could explain the decision to opt for the passporting route.
However, the situation may be changing. There are several commercial factors that could make issuers more willing to consider seriously the passport option for cross-border general retail equity offerings. First, changes in public pension policy are expected to lead to greater retail participation in capital markets. 9 Secondly, although the retail market is still quite fragmented, there are emerging signs that consumers across the EU are becoming more interested in acquiring cross-border financial services and products. 10 There is evidence that the traditional home-State bias in investment is eroding, 11 at least to the extent of being replaced with a euro-area home bias. 12 Such factors mean that there could be increasingly strong commercial advantages for issuers to reach out directly to a wider pool of potential equity investors, especially retail segments, and to utilise the prospectus passport mechanism for that purpose. Regulatory initiatives in the area of retail investor education also potentially point in the same direction. Education is increasingly recognised as a critical tool for the protection of retail investors. 13 Through investor education initiatives, better-informed retail investors may become more confident about making investment decisions on a cross-border basis.
The largest equity offering in which the prospectus passport route has been used thus far is the flotation of Standard Life plc on the London Stock Exchange, where a UK-approved prospectus was passported into Ireland, Germany and Austria. The flotation raised £1.1 billion new equity capital for the Standard Life business. There were special circumstances in this transaction because the flotation was the culmination of the process whereby Standard Life was converted from a mutual association into a quoted plc and the offer of shares included a preferential offer to its existing members in those EU countries, as well as to members in Canada, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and the UK. There appears to be no doubt that the international character of the existing ownership structure and business of Standard Life strongly influenced the decision to use the passport route. That the impetus for using the passport was not generally to reach out to retail in-vestors on a cross-border basis is evident from the fact that the non-preferential retail element of the offering was made only to UK investors. Yet it is reasonable to suppose that once the market becomes more familiar with the operation of the passport mechanism and sees it working, albeit for limited purposes, in major transactions such as Standard Life this may encourage companies and their advisers to explore its potential for more general use.
This article therefore examines the Standard Life flotation with a view to determining what we can learn from it about the practical operation of the new prospectus passport regime. Have the problems that afflicted its predecessor, in terms of a burdensome overload of multiple sets of national regulatory requirements been ironed out? Have new difficulties been created? Are there uncertainties that are costly to resolve? The size and complexity of the Standard Life flotation mean that it can be viewed as a major test for the new EU regulatory regime governing cross-border offers of securities. The insights that can be gleaned from studying it are potentially relevant to broader questions about the long-term viability of the EU's distinctive regulatory and supervisory structure in which rule-making authority is centralised but responsibility for interpretation, application, monitoring and enforcement remains fragmented between the national agencies and a network between supervisors (the Committee of European Securities Regulators or CESR).
II. The drawing up of the Standard Life prospectus and the operation of the passport: what issues emerged?
The Prospectus Directive is meant to work as follows. An issuer that is proposing to offer its securities to the public and/or apply for admission of its securities to trading on a regulated market within the EU must draw up a prospectus that, in form and content, complies with the requirements of the Directive itself and with those of the Prospectus Directive Regulation, which is a secondary measure adopted by the European Commission to prescribe the details of the information to be disclosed in a prospectus. 14 The disclosure regime set by the Prospectus Directive and the Prospectus Directive Regulation is one of maximum harmonisation. This means that national regulatory authorities cannot adopt general rules requiring a prospectus to contain items of information which are not included in relevant schedules and building blocks of the Prospectus Directive Regulation. 15 An issuer must apply to the competent authority of its home State for regulatory approval of the prospectus before it is published. 16 An approved prospectus has Community scope, which means that it is valid for public offers or the admission of the securities to trading on a regulated market in any number of States within the EU.
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The home State authority must, if so requested by the issuer, notify host State authorities that the prospectus has been approved in accordance with the Prospectus Directive and send a copy of the prospectus.
18 Host States may require translation of the summary into their official language but host States cannot impose their own approval requirements. 19 Approved prospectuses must be made available to the public in any one of a number of prescribed ways, including insertions in newspapers circulating in the Member States where the offer is made or admission is sought and on the issuer's website, but need not be sent directly to investors unless they so request. 20 Advertisements relating to offers to the public or admission of securities to trading on a regulated market are regulated. 21 Supplementary prospectuses are required in certain circumstances and these must be published in accordance with at least the same arrangements as were applied when the original prospectus was published. 22 The publication of a supplementary prospectus triggers investor withdrawal rights, 23 as does the publication of a prospectus that does not contain the final offer price, the amount of securities to be offered to be public or the criteria and/or conditions in accordance with which these elements will be determined. 
Tri-partite form of prospectus
Standard Life was the first major securities offering in the UK to adopt the new tri-partite format for prospectuses introduced by Article 5.3 of the Prospectus Directive. In a tri-partite prospectus the registration document must contain the information relating to the issuer and the securities note must contain the information concerning the securities. 25 The third part of the prospectus, the summary, should generally not be longer than 2,500 words in its original language 26 and should, in clear and non-technical language, convey the essential characteristics of, and risks associated with, the issuer, any guarantor and the transferable securities to which the issue relates. 27 The summary must also contain risk warnings informing readers that it is only an introduction, that investment decisions should be based on the prospectus and that certain pitfalls may be encountered in litigation arising from civil claims relating to prospectus information. 28 Incorporation by reference is not permitted in summaries. 29 Where a prospectus is in tri-partite form, it is permissible to publish and circulate separately its component parts. 30 This was a key factor in the Standard Life flotation where the 610-page full prospectus was published in printed form and made available free of charge at the company's registered office and at the offices of its financial advisers and electronically on the company's website but the 13-page summary was mailed directly to over five million members and customers.
31 Standard Life's summary exceeded the 2,500 normal word limit. There is room for a divergence of views between national regulators on how restrictively to interpret the requirement that the summary should not generally exceed the 2,500 word limit. So far as the UK is concerned, the FSA has indicated that it will adopt a "reasonably strict" approach but it has acknowledged that there will be circumstances when due to the particularly complex nature of the securities, the 2,500 word limit would make it very difficult, if not impossible, reasonably to explain the "essential characteristics of and risks associated with the issuer, any guarantor and the transferable securities". In these circumstances, the FSA is prepared to allow the summary to be longer than 2,500 words, but not excessively so. 32 This pragmatic response to a potential problem with the design of the Prospectus Directive seems sensible. What magic, after all, is there in 2,500 as the word limit? The underlying philosophy is reasonably clear and straightforwardretail investors should not be swamped by more information than they can reasonably be expected to absorb -and a guideline length of some sort is appropriate to facilitate the emergence of standard practices that allow investors more easily to compare information. But applying it rigidly could undermine the quality of the information supplied to retail investors, especially in complex cases.
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Designing the optimal regulatory system for the protection of retail investors is not easy. 34 Information disclosure plays an important role as it can mitigate the obvious problems of inadequate and asymmetric information faced by retail investors but, at the same time, the inability of many retail investors to understand and utilize information serves to limit both the usefulness of mandatory disclosure requirements for retail investors and the justifications for the imposition of compliance costs on firms. The FSAP, of which the Prospectus Directive was one outcome, was mainly focused on wholesale markets and arguably one of its key weaknesses was that insofar as it affected retail financial markets, it was based on inadequate evidence of retail investor behaviour and appropriate regulatory responses, limited understanding of real consumer needs and insecure foundational assumptions about the merits of widening retail investor participation in financial markets and about the relationship between law and market activity. 35 Lessons have been learnt for the future -retail financial services has been identified as a priority in the post-FSAP era and the European Commission has explicitly acknowledged the need for work in this area to be "bottom-up, based on extensive consultations, working with the grain of the market, taking into account the interaction between existing legislation and new initiatives" 36 -but the market must live with imperfect policy choices that have already been made. In relation to the prospectus summary requirement, it is vulnerable in certain respects to the charge of being inadequately thought through. Take, for in- stance, the fact that the new prospectus disclosure regime countenances the possibility of summaries being in a different language from the main body of the prospectus: this is very helpful from the perspective of issuers as it relieves them of the burden of translation costs but there is at least a perceived tension with a fundamental principle of consumer law that information should be full and written in plain language that consumers can readily understand.
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Cross-border implications of the use of a tri-partite prospectus and circulation of shortened disclosure documents
Even though the length of the summary in Standard Life's prospectus exceeded the 2,500 normal word limit, this did not prove to be problematic in the passporting process. Were a home State to be very lax in monitoring the length of summaries it is possible that this could become controversial but a realistic approach, such as that adopted by the UK FSA, seems unlikely to trouble anyone. Since host States can require prospectus summaries to be translated into their official languages, there is an inbuilt incentive in the system for issuers to control their length. The German version of the prospectus was two pages longer than the original English version.
The German regulator, Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (known as BaFin), insisted on the publication of a formal notice stating how the Standard Life prospectus had been made available to the public and where it could be obtained by the public. This administrative requirement sits uneasily with the Prospectus Directive which permits only home States to require the publication of formal notices 38 (an option which the UK FSA, when acting as home State, has not exercised) and does not allow host States to undertake any administrative procedures with regard to prospectuses.
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CESR's view is that host States cannot require issuers to publish formal notices. 40 This is an example of inconsistent interpretation of the Directive between different national competent authorities that was exposed by the Standard Life flotation. CESR's intervention may generate some pressure on individual national agencies to adjust their interpretations where these are out of line with the prevailing majority view. 
Prospectus contents
The contents of the registration document and securities note are prescribed in very considerable detail by the Prospectus Directive Regulation. Additionally, there are CESR's recommendations for the consistent implementation of prospectuses requirements. 41 The CESR recommendations provide clarification in relation to issues such as working capital disclosure, profit forecasts, capitalisation and indebtedness and also on the detailed disclosure items under the Regulation. These recommendations are not binding in EC law but CESR members are introducing them into their national requirements on a voluntary basis. This voluntary incorporation has taken place in the UK: the FSA requires issuers to have regard to the CESR recommendations and will take account of them in the prospectus approval process.
42 Detailed stipulation of prospectus contents, supported by centralised interpretation, is a strategy that is designed to minimise the risk of inconsistent implementation of the regime by national authorities. However, it is hard to think of everything in advance and it is virtually inevitable that questions will arise in practice on which there is no precise rule or, as may be, crystal clear guidance. This was certainly the case in relation to the contents of the Standard Life prospectus.
a) Historical financial information
Standard Life's accounts presented some special features that were not anticipated specifically by the disclosure regime. The Prospectus Directive Regulation requires the registration document in a prospectus relating to shares of a Community issuer to contain audited historical financial information covering the latest three financial years and the audit report in respect of each year. Such financial information must be prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards, or if not applicable, to a Member State's national accounting standards. 43 Furthermore, the last two years audited historical financial information must be presented and prepared in a form consistent with that which will be adopted in the issuer's next published annual financial statements having regard to accounting standards and policies and legislation applicable to such annual financial statements. The CESR recommendations provide guidance on these requirements and a number of worked examples. 44 However, Standard Life's position, which was complicated by its change of status from being a mutual assurance company owned by its members to a public company limited by shares, was not covered precisely by an example in the CESR recommendations. The solution that was devised to address this issue and to ensure proper comparability of financial performance over the three years was for its IFRS accounts for 2005 and 2004 and its UK GAAP accounts for 2004 and 2003 to be prepared and presented so as to show the results that would have been attributable to shareholders and policyholders had Standard Life been a public company during those years.
b) Price range prospectus
The Standard Life prospectus did not give the exact offer price for either the general or the preferential offer. Instead it gave an indicative offer price in the range of 210 pence to 270 pence per ordinary share for the general offer and stated that the preferential offer would be at a 5 per cent discount (and therefore in the range of 199.5 pence to 256.5 pence per ordinary share). The general offer price was subsequently set at 230p per share and the preferential offer price at 218.5p per share, a 5 per cent discount to the general offer price. 45 Price range prospectuses have received heightened attention under the new regulatory regime because of the provision in the Prospectus Directive for investors to be entitled to withdraw from the purchase or subscription of securities where the final offer price is not included in the prospectus, save where the criteria and/or conditions by which it will be determined are disclosed in the prospectus. 46 There are no provisions in the Prospectus Directive Regulation or CESR recommendations that amplify the requirement to specify determinative criteria or conditions 47 but UK regulatory practice has come down quickly in favour of accepting that price range prospectuses in the form followed by Standard Life avoid withdrawal rights problems, at least where the final price is within the indicative price range. Where the final price is not within the indicative price range, a supplementary prospectus may be required, in which case its publication would trigger withdrawal rights. 48 An issuer must send a pricing statement to its home State competent authority as soon as the price is determined. 49 The form and content of a pricing statement are not subject to regulation. The statement must be published in accordance with the rules governing the publication of prospectuses generally but there is no specific requirement in the Prospectus Directive or the Prospectus Directive Regulation to send it to potential investors or even to host State regulators. In practice, however, host State regulators will expect to receive a copy. 
Cross-border consistent implementation of prospectus content requirements
It is unrealistic and, arguably, undesirable to aim for a pan-European regulatory regime for prospectuses in which every last detail is covered by a specific rule and every point on which there is room for uncertainty has been anticipated and addressed by CESR guidance. Such a regime would be liable to collapse under its own weight. The Standard Life flotation demonstrates that the current system, in which there is room for national securities regulators in dialogue with the transacting parties and their advisers to determine points of uncertainty, can be made to work well, with the FSA, as the home State regulator in that transaction, dealing with matters to the evident satisfaction of the various host States. It was only in relation to the publication of a formal notice that there was a difference of views between the national authorities on the entitlements of home and host States under the Directive.
Yet leaving it to national regulators to interpret points of uncertainty undoubtedly carries with it the obvious risk of inconsistent implementation. This is where CESR, as the co-ordinating network, can play a valuable role. points where views diverged. 52 This document, which has since been updated and expanded, was produced at the behest of market participants, and is intended to provide the market with responses in a quick and efficient manner to everyday questions which are commonly posed to the CESR Secretariat or CESR members. It is quite possible that experience gleaned from the Standard Life flotation is reflected in its contents: the document includes responses on cross-border publication of pricing statements and on formal notices, which were issues that were relevant in relation to Standard Life.
The publication of a "Q and A" document of this sort is clearly not a headline-grabbing initiative and it could even seem rather mundane. Yet it is worth highlighting as a positive example of CESR's role as a facilitator of the convergent functioning of supervisors' operational work and the smooth functioning of the markets. It is sensible for CESR to focus on improving mechanisms for the pooling and publication of regulatory know-how that has been hammered out on the anvil of real transactional experience. The benefits for market participants and regulators of being able easily to tap into the results of such experience are readily apparent.
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III. Prospectus liability and use of the passport 1. Interplay between public and private enforcement of securities laws
Various factors drive the careful effort that goes into the process of compiling a prospectus. The need to obtain regulatory approval is an obvious one. So too is the threat of public enforcement by the regulator or by the criminal authorities. The publication of a prospectus containing false information could be a breach of listing rules or market abuse for which monetary administrative penalties can be imposed by the regulatory authorities 54 and in some circumstances it could also amount to a criminal offence. 55 Potential civil liability to investors who have suffered loss as a consequence of the false prospectus is also relevant. How significant is the risk of civil liability in ensuring that the information contained in a prospectus is complete and accurate? This question can be viewed as a specific aspect of a wider ongoing debate about the role of enforcement of legal rules in relation to the development of securities markets. Influential law and finance scholarship has linked the development of stock markets with measures of private enforcement such as extensive disclosure requirements and special securities law civil remedies that facilitate claims by investors. 56 There is no reason to doubt that special civil remedies in securities laws have the potential to boost investor confidence in the quality of prospectus information by reducing the incentives for issuers and their directors to provide inaccurate information. Furthermore, by clearly extending the range of potential defendants to some of the advisers on a public issue of securities as well as the issuer and its directors, civil liability provisions in securities laws could reinforce the concern of intermediaries for their reputation and help to ensure that they will perform properly their key investor protection function of filtering out false or misleading information. 57 However, there are some curiosities about the strong emphasis on private enforcement as it does not appear to be entirely consistent with the way in which private enforcement works in practice. 58 The much-debated and often criticized US experience of private enforcement through the securities class action suggests that private enforcement is at best an imperfect tool. 59 Indeed, recent influential reports have called for reform of private enforcement mechanisms in the US to curb abuses of the system in the form of claims that are brought purely in order to extract settlements rather than to obtain redress for genuine grievances. 60 From the European perspective, on the other hand, there is some concern that private mechanisms of enforcement by aggrieved investors play too small a role. Ferrarini and Giudici, for example, point to the fact that investors in the scandal-hit Italian company, Parmalat, looked to the US rather than the Italian courts for civil relief and attribute this course of events to Europe's unfriendly approach to private enforcement of collective interests. 61 They argue for the introduction of class action-like mechanisms in Europe, as well as the recognition of contingency fee arrangements and the upgrading of discovery and other civil procedure rules. They suggest that in the absence of such reforms "any serious hope that investor claims could take a significant role in the enforcement of securities law is ungrounded."
There is some evidence of a gradual evolution towards contingency fees in various European countries and there are even some tentative moves in the direction of collective enforcement mechanisms, including class actions, particularly in the area of consumer protection. 62 
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This model case procedure differs from the US class action in certain important respects but shares with it the feature that it is a mechanism for the handling of mass proceedings. Interestingly, Germany's consideration of the development of collective action mechanisms has been linked to the difficulties faced by the German courts in handling litigation brought by 15,000 individual claimants against Deutsche Telecom, arising from a share sale in 2000. 64 The slow pace and cumbersome process involved in the litigation in the German courts compared unfavourably with a US class action against Deutsche Telecom arising out of the same facts, which was settled for $ 120 million in 2005. Yet the European trends are more likely to be gradual and incremental rather than being in the direction of radical change.
Standards of accuracy in relation to prospectuses are perceived to be high in the UK and this has been linked in part to civil liability standards. 65 From the viewpoint of a reader of the law reports, this linkage could be thought surprising because there are remarkably few modern civil cases concerned with 1986 reveals only two other reported cases involving a claim by investors for breach of a common law duty of care in relation to the contents of a securities prospectus. In the first case the defendant directors succeeded in having significant elements of the statement of claim against them struck out on the grounds that they disclosed no reasonable cause of action. 70 In the second case, the court took a more favourable view of the claimants' position and held that it was at least arguable that the defendants had assumed and owed a duty of care to those investors who relied on the contents of the prospectus in making secondary market purchases. 71 However, there is no record of either case proceeding to a full trial on the merits. Of course, a preliminary ruling that there is (or is not) a case to answer may suffice to bring about an agreement between the parties on an out-of-court settlement of the substantive issues. 72 One further case involved a preliminary skirmish in an action by investors against the sponsor of an issue of prospectuses to raise subscriptions for shares in companies where it was alleged that there were material misrepresentations in the prospectuses. 73 An internet report suggests that the action was settled out of court.
c) Common law negligence/misrepresentation cases in private placings and M&A transactions
This is not to say that civil law cases are wholly irrelevant in transactions involving the acquisition of securities. Broadening the search (over the same period) to private placements of securities and M&A transactions does produce examples of investors seeking to use the general civil law to obtain compensation where an investment in shares had turned sour and the problems could be traced back to financial or other information supplied by or on behalf of the company in whose shares they had invested. Cases can be found where investors succeeded in claiming compensation from companies and/or their directors on the grounds that they had been induced by fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations to enter into share sale and purchase or sub- scription agreements. 75 There are also plenty of preliminary rulings on procedural or other aspects of entitlements to pursue such claims. 76 Yet, insofar as the concern of this inquiry relates to the incentives for those compiling a prospectus to do their job properly, these cases have only limited significance. An investor who acquires securities on the basis of a prospectus that is alleged to be inaccurate is likely to find it hard to sue successfully for deceit because of the high threshold for deceit liability to arise. (Indeed, it was recognition of the heavy burden involved in proving deceit that lay behind the enactment of a special statutory securities law claim in relation to prospectuses back in the Directors Liability Act of 1890, the predecessor of s 90 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.) Even though a negligent misrepresentation claim under s 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 has a lower liability threshold than deceit, this claim also plays a limited role in relation to prospectuses because it is only available to persons who can establish a direct contractual nexus with the maker of the offending statement.
Another civil law claim that features in cases reported during the period involving M&A transactions is of investors suing for breach of the common law duty of care. This area of the law is dominated by the leading case of Caparo Industries plc v Dickman 77 where it was held that auditors conducting the statutory audit of a company did not owe a duty of care to a bidder for the company. The boundaries of Caparo have been tested in a line of subsequent cases exploring the special circumstances in which such a duty of care could arise, 78 79 There are also a few cases where directors of a target company were later sued by the bidder company for breach of a duty of care in the preparation of financial or other information relied on by the bidder in making the bid but none where the claim proceeded to full trial and the claimants succeeded in being awarded compensation. 80 The pattern that emerges from this brief review of recent British civil law cases on liability for disclosures by companies, directors and advisers can be interpreted as being broadly consistent with Ferrarini and Giudici's more wide-ranging work on the Italian position: investors in the UK markets do not look much to the British courts for redress, albeit perhaps for different reasons from those that make the option of bringing a civil claim unattractive to investors in other countries. This puts in question the significance of private enforcement as a mechanism in the modern UK regulatory toolkit.
Public enforcement, by comparison, is a growth area in the UK. Since 2000 more than 70 cases brought by the FSA have resulted in administrative penalties and six cases have been pursued through the criminal court system. 81 However, these figures cover the full range of the FSA's supervisory responsibilities: i.e. banking and insurance as well as securities. Only a few of the FSA cases to date have related to company disclosures 82 but they include one of the most high profile actions brought by the FSA thus far, which resulted in a monetary administrative penalty of £17 million being imposed on Shell/Royal Dutch Petroleum Company for market abuse and breaches of the Listing Rules in respect of false or misleading announcements to the market. 83 Shell agreed to pay this fine without admitting or denying the findings or conclusions. On the criminal side, in 2005 the FSA brought its first prosecution for false statements and was successful in obtaining convictions against former directors, who were given prison sentences. 84 Commenting on the criminal case the FSA's Director of Enforcement emphasized that the efficient operation of the markets depended on investors' ability to rely on information released by companies and that directors could expect to be held personally responsible for the announcements they made to the market. 85 However, while public enforcement seems to be pursued more vigorously than private enforcement in the UK, it is important to note that when compared to the US, the FSA does not rely heavily on its enforcement powers.
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So what conclusions can we draw about enforcement and its impact on the accuracy of prospectuses (or other disclosures)? The number of successful cases, whether on the private or public side, has only limited informative value in determining the most effective incentives for directors, financial advisers and others involved in prospectus or other disclosures to focus on ensuring that the information is accurate and complete. There is an important distinction to be drawn between "outputs" -a quantitative measurement, such as of numbers of cases -and "outcomes" -whereby the impact regulatory requirements may have had is assessed. 87 For one thing outputs alone do not tell us much about the effectiveness of the threat of enforcement as a deterrent. Admittedly, enforcement and deterrence are entwined as effective enforcement is an important signal in achieving deterrence. 88 The fact that there have been few past cases could suggest that civil litigation is a relatively low-level risk compared to the possibility of public enforcement, and that it is therefore only a weak deterrent but this does not seem to ring true at least in relation to prospectuses where, as noted earlier, a link between liability and the high quality of prospectus disclosure has been identified. 89 Careful market participants and their advisers will be aware that they cannot afford to be too complacent about civil litigation risks because there is always the possibility of a future development that could have adverse ramifications even for completed transactions, such as a test case that changes the common law with retrospective as well as prospective effect, 90 a change in the rules governing the standing of claimants or otherwise smoothing the process by which claims are brought, 91 or broader market developments, such as the emergence of more activist investors who view civil litigation more favourably as a potential mechanism for obtaining redress. Furthermore the incidence of private settlements that are concluded entirely behind the scenes without anything leaking out into the public domain is obviously unknown but it is not fanciful to suppose that such payouts are made in circumstances where powerful institutional investors have a credible basis for challenging the accuracy of disclosures.
Another respect in which the number of decided cases where investors have sued successfully for compensation is only part of the story is that it does not take account of the strain that preparing a defence to a possible claim would place on managerial time and emotions and its other direct and indirect costs. Quite consistently with an intention to produce disclosures that are complete and candid, responsible persons may worry about the risks of being caught up in even the early stages of threatened civil litigation. It is helpful for some purposes to distinguish between "litigation risk" -the risk of being suedand "liability risk" -the risk of actually losing the case and being held liable to pay compensation. The maker of a statement can control liability risk by being candid, complete and accurate but litigation risk is much less manage- able as it is affected by factors, such as investors' willingness to sue and the robustness of the courts in dismissing hopeless cases at an early stage, that are outside the maker's direct control.
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Recent discussion in the UK prompted by the EC Transparency Directive, 93 which regulates the periodic disclosure of information by issuers with securities admitted to trading on regulated markets, suggests that liability and litigation risks in respect of disclosures are not a peripheral concern for directors and others, notwithstanding the paucity of modern cases that are directly in point. A new statutory liability regime for Transparency Directive-related disclosures has been inserted in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 by the Companies Act 2006. 94 This liability attaches to issuers but directors are expressly shielded from liability. During the passage of the new companies legislation into law there was considerable pressure to extend the safe harbour from civil liability that the new regime affords to directors to other types of disclosure. The Government chose not to amend the new statutory regime but it did accept that the liability and litigation risks facing directors and others were sufficiently serious to warrant a detailed examination of the public policy considerations surrounding the establishment of a comprehensive liability regime that covered all financial disclosures and it appointed Professor Paul Davies of the London School of Economics to conduct this review on its behalf. 
How liability and litigation risk concerns may affect passporting decisions
Concerns relating to potential civil liability are relevant to decisions on whether or not to make a cross-border offering of securities on the basis of a passported prospectus because not passporting provides a shield against the possibility of parallel proceedings in various jurisdictions and the associated intensified litigation-risk burdens. Some European bodies have argued for an "issuer nationality" approach to liability for securities disclosures -whereby liability would be governed by the law of the country of incorporation of the issuer rather than by the law of the countries in which harm occurs 96 -but policymakers have not yet been fully persuaded by the merits of this approach. 97 Instead, the prevailing approach envisages the possibility of multiple suits in various countries in which liability is governed by different national laws.
Civil jurisdiction within the EU is regulated by the EC Regulation No 44/2001 (the Brussels Regulation) 98 which, as a general rule, allocates jurisdiction on the basis of domicile of the defendant 99 but which, in tort claims (i.e. claims where a defendant's non-contractual civil liability is in question), provides also for jurisdiction in the courts of the location of the harmful event. governing a tort claim, 102 which is to be regulated by the EC Rome II Regulation. 103 As yet there is only limited EU-wide harmonisation of the mechanisms of private enforcement of securities laws. This is a specific aspect of a much broader point, namely, that the EU still remains far away from being a genuine European area of justice in civil and commercial matters in which people can approach courts and authorities in any Member State as easily as in their own. 104 In the financial markets field the current emphasis is mainly on the development of out-of-court dispute resolution mechanisms. 105 The substantive content of national civil liability claims is not harmonised. Thus the Prospectus Directive ventures only very tentatively into the field of civil liability by requiring Member States to apply their national laws on civil liability at least to issuers or their administrative, supervisory or management bodies, whilst saying nothing about the contents of these laws. 106 This means that those contemplating passported share issuance activity within Europe must still take account of multiple, potentially quite divergent, prospectus liability regimes and consider the strain of possibly being involved in litigation under several different legal systems.
Examples of differences between national liability regimes with potential ramifications for cross-border flotations
The UK Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) (which has been amended to implement the Prospectus Directive), s 90 allows investors to claim compensation for false and misleading statements in, or omissions from, prospectuses. In covering omissions as well as positive misstatements and half truths, the FSMA claim is more favourable than the civil sanctions under the general law relating to misrepresentation. The FSMA claim is also available to a potentially larger group of aggrieved investors than other civil sanctions in that secondary market purchasers as well as original investors can sue. 107 A wide range of responsible persons against whom a FSMA claim can be brought is clearly set out. 108 The category includes the directors of the issuer and other persons who are required to give responsibility statements in the prospectus. This list includes reporting accountants in respect of the financial information, but not sponsors. Having a list of responsible persons is doubly advantageous to investors compared to other civil sanctions because its clarity means that they are relieved of the burden of showing that statements are attributable to particular persons and its broad scope increases the chances of finding a sufficiently deep financial pocket to cover the amount of any damages awarded. The elements that an investor must establish in order to succeed are softer than in relation to other civil sanctions; in particular, there is no need to show reliance on the inaccurate information. There is a partial FSMA liability shield for prospectus summaries: statutory liability will attach to persons who are responsible for the summary but only if the summary is misleading, inaccurate or inconsistent when read together with the other parts of the prospectus. 109 There are certain defences available to persons who are prima facie responsible for the contents of a prospectus and therefore liable to be sued under FSMA. 110 As envisaged by the Prospectus Directive, 111 UK prospectus law makes offerors as well as issuers responsible for prospectus contents. 112 However, an offeror is not responsible for a prospectus if the issuer is responsible, the prospectus was drawn up primarily by the issuer or on its behalf and the offeror is making the offer in association with the issuer. 113 This ensures that persons such as the Standard Life policyholders who chose to sell their demutualisation shares alongside the offer of new shares by the company do not run the risk of being held financially liable for the contents of a prospectus over which they have had no control.
However, selling shareholder liability can be an issue in a cross-border context. A problem arises, for example, under Irish law, which is one of the countries into which Standard Life passported its offer. In Ireland statutory liability to pay compensation to persons who acquire securities on the faith of a false or incomplete prospectus arises under the Investment Funds, Companies and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 2005, s 41. Selling shareholders are included in the category of persons who have this statutory liability and in the context of a passported offer there is no provision qualifying their responsibility in circumstances where the primary responsibility for the prospectus lies with the issuer. Although the Irish Prospectus (Directive 2003/ 71/EC) Regulations 2005 are similar to the UK position in that they provide for offerors to be responsible for a prospectus save where the offer is made in association with the issuer and the issuer is primarily responsible for the prospectus, 114 the rules on responsibility under these Regulations apply only where Ireland is the home State. 115 Where Ireland is not the home State, all offerors are potentially responsible. The problem can be resolved by structuring the offer such that Irish resident investors are offered only new shares issued by the company, thereby ensuring that selling shareholders are not offerors in Ireland. So the difficulties are not insurmountable but they will require (costly) specialist legal advice to determine their precise significance in a transaction-specific context and to achieve a solution that is legally and practically workable.
Certain liability-related issues also arise in relation to Germany, another of the countries into which the Standard Life offer was made. There are concerns about the implications under German consumer protection laws of mailing a German translation of the summary of an English-language prospectus to potential investors. The partial shield against civil liability for summaries provided by the Prospectus Directive has been fully implemented into German law 116 but the operation of the shield in cross-border contexts where Failure to meet the standards required by consumer protection laws can result in terms being not binding on the consumer, which is not something that the prospectus liability shield would protect against. The prospect of two EU-wide regulatory regimes being significantly at odds with each other is clearly an unattractive conclusion that reasonable persons would resist but the tension between the regime for securities offerings, where it is accepted that translation burdens need to be eased so as not to deter cross-border activity, and consumer law is not altogether easy to resolve. German debate on this issue highlights the fact that the prospectus rules are merely one part of a larger and often very complex set of relevant requirements, especially in offerings with a retail component, that needs to be considered.
Secondary market developments
Pan-European passporting is an opt-in regime. In this respect (as in many others), the EU regime is very different to that in the US where the securities laws have pan-US offerings at their heart and intrastate offerings operate under an exemption. 118 However, the element of choice that the Prospectus Directive continues to give to issuers with regard to where they make their primary offerings contrasts with the Transparency Directive, which imposes new periodic financial disclosure obligations on issuers with securities admitted to trading on any regulated market and, with a view to promoting integration, requires this information to be disseminated throughout the EU so that all investors are on an equal footing with regard to access to investment information. 119 Member States are required to reinforce the disclosure obligations with appropriate liability rules attaching at least to the issuer. 120 Once admitted to a regulated market, issuers must therefore contend with the prospect of multi-jurisdictional litigation in respect of their periodic dis-closures as liability could arise in each of the jurisdictions in which the information is received and acted upon. 121 Of course, in a sense there is nothing new here because, even before the Transparency Directive, issuers with publicly-quoted shares faced the risk that investors in various countries might acquire their securities and later sue in their local courts. However, the Transparency Directive has led to concerns in some quarters of an increased risk of multiple civil liability suits under different national laws, for example because, even though national laws may remain the same, investors may find it easier to establish the factors (such as receipt of information within the jurisdiction) on which liability depends or because the Directive may have a dynamic effect on Member States' liability laws and result in the enactment of new remedies that are more favourable to investors. EU deliberations on the harmonisation of conflict of laws rules for torts (including negligent misstatement) may eventually prove to be the forum for the resolution of the debate sparked by the concerns about the liability ramifications of the Transparency Directive, but in the meantime the position is tricky and uncertain.
The heightened potential for multiple periodic disclosure civil liability suits by investors in the secondary market that results from the Transparency Directive could indirectly influence decisions on whether to use the passport in the primary market, but precisely how it would affect such decisions is rather unclear and may depend on the particular circumstances of the issuer. The view taken by an issuer that has already taken the step of having its securities admitted to trading on a regulated market and which is considering a rights issue or some form of secondary offering seems likely to be influenced by the fact that cross-border liability and litigation risks are matters with which it should be already familiar in the context of its periodic disclosures as that familiarity should enable it to make a more informed assessment of the burden that would be involved in managing prospectus-related liability and litigation risks. The considerations for a new entrant at the time of its flotation onto a regulated market may be quite different. At that point in an issuer's life, limiting the jurisdictional scope of the primary market offering by not passporting may still appear to be a valuable strategy for managing liability and litigation risks, notwithstanding the exposure to secondary mar- ket liability risks that will open up after flotation. The considerations for a company that is making a public offer within the Prospectus Directive but not seeking to have its securities admitted to trading on a regulated market (and therefore not subject to the Transparency Directive) could well be different again.
IV. Conclusion
The Standard Life flotation was a major test for the new law on prospectuses and, overall, it came through it well. The prospectus passport mechanism worked quite smoothly in facilitating the offer of securities into Ireland, Germany and Austria. Only one issue on which there was a difference of views on the powers of home and host State regulators emerged and that was with regard to an administrative matter, namely whether host States could insist on the publication of formal notices, rather than an issue going to the heart of the transaction. In these early days of the new regime, transactions such as Standard Life represent significant learning experiences for those involved in them. CESR is proving to be a useful conduit for the dissemination of such learning by gathering together questions that market participants have asked of national competent authorities and publishing responses to them that represent common positions agreed by CESR Members.
The simplification of the passporting regime does not extend as far as civil liability, which remains a complex area. Those contemplating passported share issuance activity within Europe must still take account of multiple, potentially quite divergent, prospectus liability regimes. Jurisdiction and choice of law rules mean that they could be sued in more than one country and liability could be determined under different national laws. Detailed advice from local lawyers on prospectus liability and wider legal implications of offering securities into their jurisdiction is still required.
The Prospectus Directive allows issuers to choose whether to offer their securities on a cross-border basis by means of a passported prospectus. The option of not passporting as a tool for managing liability and litigation risks associated with prospectuses is thus available. That consideration may have influenced the structure of the Standard Life flotation where the passport was used only for the purposes of a preferential offer to members and employees and only in those EU countries outside the UK in which it already had a significant retail presence. It was not a "full" retail cross-border offering. However, for issuers that take the step of having their securities admitted to trading on a regulated market, cross-border liability and litigation risks associated with periodic disclosures cannot be easily sidestepped because of requirements under the Transparency Directive for the pan-European dissemination of information.
Public enforcement through national securities regulators and the co-ordination of their efforts through CESR have tended to be the policy priorities in recent years but the Prospectus and, especially, Transparency Directives are moving private enforcement towards the foreground of policy discussion. It is evident, too, that civil liability and litigation risks are being viewed with increasing concern by the market as regulatory developments enhance their intensity. The growing prominence of these concerns could be thought rather curious given the low levels of actual enforcement by investors. This article provides a review of modern British cases on liability to investors for disclosures and concludes that liability is rarely imposed. However, it seems unlikely that the growing attention being paid to private enforcement is wholly misplaced. Quite what role private enforcement plays and its interrelationship with public enforcement are particular hard questions to address in the European context because of the nationally fragmented nature of the mechanisms of both public and private enforcement but it is clear that the number of decided cases is only one small piece of this large and complex jigsaw.
